Cryptography and password hashing
Two libraries carry Connect's cryptography. cryptography encrypts the credentials a business stores in Connect, such as provider keys and tokens, and verifies signed messages from providers. argon2-cffi hashes passwords with Argon2, so a password is checked without ever being stored. Webhook HMACs use Python's standard hmac module.
What it is#
cryptography is maintained by the Python Cryptographic Authority. It offers high-level recipes, such as Fernet authenticated encryption, and low-level primitives (hazmat) built on OpenSSL.
argon2-cffi binds the reference Argon2 implementation. Argon2 won the Password Hashing Competition in 2015 and is specified in RFC 9106. It is deliberately slow and memory-hard, which makes guessing passwords from a stolen hash expensive.
- Category
- Cryptography libraries
- Versions in Connect
cryptography>=42;argon2-cffi>=25.1,<26- Recipes used
- Fernet; elliptic-curve and RSA signature verification; X.509
- Official sites
- cryptography.io, argon2-cffi.readthedocs.io
Where Connect uses it#
| Place in Connect | What it does there |
|---|---|
backend/app/crypto.py | Encryption and decryption of stored secrets (Fernet) |
backend/app/email_delivery_webhooks.py | Verifying signed delivery notifications |
backend/app/saas_sso.py | Single sign-on signatures and certificates |
backend/app/app_auth.py, account_auth.py | Argon2 password hashes for passwords and one-time codes |
How it connects#
- A business saves a provider key in settings
crypto.pyencrypts it with the host's key before it is written- PostgreSQL stores only ciphertext
- At use, it is decrypted in memory for the one request
- Inbound webhooks are verified (HMAC or signature) before their content is trusted
Benefits and limits#
What it gives Connect:
- Fernet is authenticated: tampered ciphertext fails to decrypt rather than decrypting to garbage.
- Argon2 parameters can be raised over time, and the stored hash records its own parameters.
- Signature checks use constant-time comparison (
hmac.compare_digest).
Where it stops, and what Connect does about it:
- Encryption at rest is only as strong as the key's custody. The key lives in the host environment, not the database (encryption at rest).
- Rotating the encryption key means re-encrypting stored values.
crypto.pyis a wide-radius file and runs the whole regression set when it changes. - Argon2 costs CPU per sign-in by design. Sign-in endpoints are rate limited.
Security and privacy#
- No plaintext secret is written to the database or the logs.
- Passwords and codes are stored as hashes, and a code is limited per network and per address.
- Provider webhooks without a valid signature are refused. A nonce index stops replay (webhook signatures).
Licence, cost and versions#
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Licence | cryptography: Apache-2.0 or BSD-3-Clause. argon2-cffi: MIT |
| Cost | None |
| Version | cryptography>=42; argon2-cffi within 25.x |
| Compatibility | cryptography ships wheels with its own OpenSSL for Linux x86-64 |
Troubleshooting#
InvalidTokenwhen reading a stored credential- The encryption key on the host is not the key the value was written with. Restore the right key; do not re-save over the value.
- Webhook refused as unsigned
- The provider's signing secret in settings does not match, or a proxy changed the body. Signatures cover the raw bytes.
- Sign-in feels slow
- Expected within reason: Argon2 is meant to cost time.
Official references#
Questions#
Can Connect's staff read my stored API keys?
They are encrypted at rest and decrypted only in memory for the request that uses them. Screens show that a key is saved, never the key itself.
Why Argon2 and not bcrypt?
Argon2 is memory-hard as well as slow, which raises the cost of guessing on GPUs, and it is the current recommendation of RFC 9106 and OWASP.