The Connect MCP server
Connect runs one remote MCP server at POST https://connectbyjbrh.com/mcp using Streamable HTTP and protocol revision 2026-07-28, and still answers clients of 2025-11-25, 2025-06-18 and 2025-03-26. Public documentation tools are anonymous. Private tools require OAuth and are bound to the authorized workspace and selected business; among them, three operations tools reach every operation of Connect's versioned API as the person who consented.
Endpoint#
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Endpoint | https://connectbyjbrh.com/mcp |
| Transport | Streamable HTTP, POST |
| Protocol | 2026-07-28 |
| Public tools | Documentation only, no credential |
| Private tools | OAuth 2.1 authorization code + PKCE S256 |
| Protected-resource metadata | /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp |
| Authorization-server metadata | /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server |
| Client registration | /oauth/register for compatible public clients |
| Discovery | /.well-known/mcp.json |
| Operations tools | connect_list_operations, connect_describe_operation, connect_call_operation |
| Discovery | server/discover, and GET /.well-known/mcp.json |
| Health | GET /mcp/health — catalogue and database checks, aggregate counters, no tenant data |
Business isolation#
- The caller cannot supply a workspace or business id to widen its grant.
- Business data reads use the same Data Workspace business-reach rules as the application.
- Configuration writes call existing business services instead of arbitrary SQL or arbitrary route proxies.
- Owner diagnostic tools are not present in the production marketplace registry.
Every Connect operation#
The 384 operations of Connect's versioned API are reachable as a catalogue rather than as 384 tools, because every client in use caps or degrades on very long tool lists. Search it, read one operation's schema, then perform it.
| Tool | What it does | Scope |
|---|---|---|
connect_list_operations | Search the catalogue by area, risk tier or words, paged with cursor. Each entry gives its id, risk tier, required scope, whether the person must confirm it, and whether this connection may use it. | mcp:app:read |
connect_describe_operation | The full contract of one operation: what it does, its tier, scope, confirmation rule and the exact JSON Schema of its path, query and body arguments. | mcp:app:read |
connect_call_operation | Perform one operation as the person who connected the client. Writes accept idempotency_key; consequential operations wait for confirmation. | The operation's own tier |
Every operation runs as the person who connected the client, through the same handler their browser reaches, so their role, their business access, their plan, the autonomy mode, the approval policy and the audit trail apply unchanged. Two things are deliberately different: an agent is never treated as the person pressing Send, so a send under ask-before-send comes back held rather than skipping the gate; and approving held work is refused with person_required, because that step is the person's to take in Connect.
Delete, execute, admin and financial operations are never performed on the first call. A client that speaks revision 2026-07-28 and declares elicitation gets an input_required result carrying an elicitation form, which it shows the person; the retry with their answer performs the operation. Any other client gets a result with status: confirmation_required, a plain summary of exactly what would happen and a confirmation_token: show the person the summary, and only if they agree call again with the identical arguments plus that token. The token is bound to this authorization, this operation and these exact arguments, lasts ten minutes, and its nonce becomes the request's idempotency key, so a confirmed operation retried after a timeout returns its first answer (replayed: true) instead of being performed twice.
Tool safety#
Production tools declare MCP annotations for read-only, destructive, idempotent and open-world behavior. Consequential actions — sending, calling, running, deleting, administering, billing — are reachable only through connect_call_operation, only with the matching scope, and never on the first call: the person confirms each one, and a confirmed operation is performed at most once. Nothing reaches a database, SQL or an internal route directly; every operation is a handler of the versioned API the Connect apps themselves use.
How a protected call is challenged#
Tool discovery is intentionally possible before account linking, so a marketplace can show what Connect offers. Calling a protected tool without suitable authorization does not silently return an empty business and does not execute partially. The tool result carries an MCP authentication challenge pointing at the protected-resource metadata. A compatible host follows that document to the authorization server, completes authorization code plus PKCE, then retries with the resulting bearer token.
The protected tool itself names the scope it needs in its security scheme. Business record searches and ordinary readiness reads ask for mcp:business:read; configuration and customer-operation writes ask for mcp:business:write; the operations tools ask for mcp:app:read to search and describe, and connect_call_operation for the tier of the operation being performed. A client can therefore start with reads and step up to the one permission a task needs, instead of asking for everything at consent.
Failure behavior worth testing#
- A protected call without OAuth returns an authorization challenge rather than workspace data.
- A token without the named scope is refused; a business binding alone is not permission.
- A business id included as an invented tool argument is rejected where the schema does not allow it.
- A record id from another business is treated as outside the current business reach rather than as a shortcut around list filtering.
- A production process does not advertise Owner diagnostic tools. Their development opt-in is ignored in production.
- A customer-operation write that reaches an approval boundary reports the held/refused outcome instead of converting the model invocation into a person's approval.
- A delete, send or call without confirmation returns
confirmation_required(or an elicitation) and changes nothing. - A confirmation token replayed returns the first answer with
replayed: true; it never performs the operation twice. - A connection holding only
mcp:app:readis refused a write withinsufficient_scopenamingmcp:app:write.
Questions#
Can I use Connect MCP without signing in?
Yes for public product documentation. Private business data requires OAuth.
Can one business grant read another business?
No. Protected tools derive the business from authorization and enforce the application's business reach.
Does the plugin ZIP contain a secret?
No. OAuth discovery and credential storage are client-managed.